Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I am a member of the Intelligence Committee, and

I need to state, for the record, a disclaimer, and that is, I want to

make certain that—and state, in certain terms, that no question I

ask should be interpreted to suggest that I’m referring to any facts

other than those facts that are widely known and are in the public

domain. Any suggestion to the contrary would be inaccurate.

Having said that, I’m struck this morning by how parochial this

discussion has been. And I’ve listened to the—each of you describe

the problem, and I’m—I can’t—until I walked in to this hearing

this morning, I thought the only two people on the face of this

planet that believed that Israel would allow Iran to completely

develop a nuclear weapon were the President and the Ayatollah in

Iran. But, I’m struck that perhaps there’s other people that think

otherwise.

If you look at the history of this, what Israel has done in the

past, particularly in Iraq, and second, most recently, in Syria, and

think that that points to anything other than the fact that Israel

is not going to allow this to happen, regardless of what we do, we

say, we hold negotiations, or we impose sanctions, it seems to me

to be incredibly naive. Certainly, their intelligence, one would have

to assume, is as good as our intelligence. And although I agree that

a military strike will not completely take out all of the nuclear

capability, it will certainly destroy links in the chain that will put

them off for probably years. It just seems to me that this discussion

needs to be—needs to include, in a lot more focused fashion, what’s

going to happen when Israel does what I think it inevitably will do

to keep the Iranians from completing a nuclear weapon.

And, Mr. Wisner, I’d like your response to that.

Well, Ambassador Wisner, I don’t disagree with

you, and I’m certainly not—I hope you didn’t think that I was suggesting

that that was a good thing. I think, however, that, given

what we know, it seems to me a reasonable conclusion that that’s

where Israel will wind up on this. If you look at the threat that

they felt from, most recently, Syria, and, before that, some years

before that, Iraq, it wasn’t nearly the threat that they feel right

now with Iran breathing down their neck.

And, with all due respect regarding your anticipation that Iran

would come back very quickly, I would say that I don’t think, necessarily,

the Israelis share that conclusion. And, as a result of all

that, I think that we need to, as we analyze this—and I think all

of you are thinking about this—we need to factor in that whole scenario,

because we’re tremendously parochial. We’re sitting here

talking, ‘‘Well, we’ll do this, we’ll do that. If we do this, the Iranians

will do that.’’ We’ve got to factor in—if you just put yourself,

for a moment, in the shoes of the leaders of Israel, they look at this

entirely differently than we look at it. And having said that, I

think that needs to be factored in.

Ambassador Haass, I know you’ve been wanting to get your two

cents’ worth in.

Well, I would just conclude with—I think that

anyone who thinks that Israel hasn’t thought this through and has

an idea of where they’re going to go with this, I think would be

very naive. And, again, I want to urge, in the strongest terms, that

everyone should factor this into our ideas of where we are going

with this, because, again, you know, admittedly, Israel has not

acted, to this point. But, you remember, they took 4,000 rockets

from Hamas before they acted, recently, in Gaza. And so, they are

a little bit like us, in that they will—they’ll wait and do what they

have to do. But, this—as we know—we’ve watched the Europeans

negotiate with Iran for, what, 5 years, 51⁄2 years; and, through all

those negotiations, and through all of this, all they do is put one

foot in front of the other, getting toward where I think, and even

Ambassador Wisner has concluded, that they will eventually wind

up, regardless of what we do.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.